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Abstract: In an approach analogous to Rajan and Zingales (1998), we examine how the 
ability to access long-term debt affects firm-level growth volatility. We find that firms in 
industries with stronger preference to use long-term finance relative to short-term finance 
experience lower growth volatility in countries with better-developed financial systems, as 
these firms may benefit from reduced refinancing risk. Institutions that facilitate the 
availability of credit information and contract enforcement mitigate refinancing risk and 
therefore growth volatility associated with short-term financing. Increased availability of 
long-term finance reduces growth volatility in crisis as well as non-crisis periods. 
 
 
Keywords: Debt maturity; financial dependence; firm volatility; financial development 
 
JEL classification: G20, G32, O16 
  
                                                 
 
 
1 We thank two anonymous referees for useful comments and suggestions. This paper’s findings, 
interpretations, and conclusions are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. 
2 
 
1     Introduction 
The tendency of firms to match the maturity of their assets and liabilities is well 
established in the literature (Hart and Moore, 1995; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). 
Firms that operate in environments where the availability of long-term finance is limited due 
to market failures and policy weaknesses, such as weak information infrastructures, macro 
and political instability, poor contract enforcement, and weak investor protection, tend to be 
at a disadvantage when it comes to financing their long-term investments. A firm that can 
only use short-term debt to finance long-term assets continually needs to roll over its credit, 
which introduces refinancing risk as creditors may at some point refuse to roll over their 
financing. Refinancing risk potentially increases firm-level economic volatility, as firms that 
cannot refinance their investments may be forced to prematurely sell them at reduced prices 
possibly inducing bankruptcy. 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between long-term debt finance and economic 
volatility using firm-level data for a set of 47 countries over the 1995-2013 period. We 
consider a firm-level growth volatility variable based on accounting data, and an asset return 
volatility variable based on stock market data. In order to deal with the identification problem 
that less volatile firms may be attracting more long-term finance, we relate our measures of 
firm-level volatility to financial and institutional development proxies in combination with an 
index of a firm’s preference for long-term debt use, following Rajan and Zingales (1998). A 
firm’s preference for long-term debt is captured by US firms’ use of long-term debt in that 
industry, under the assumption that US firms are least likely to be constrained in their access 
to long term debt. 
Our results suggest that the availability of long-term finance, be it in the form of bank 
loans or debt securities, reduces firm-level volatility, consistent with the notion that long-
term finance mitigates refinancing risk. Refinancing risk is potentially more relevant at a time 
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of financial crisis when bank credit is contracting. We also examine this in our analysis by 
splitting the overall sample period into a pre-crisis period 1995-2006, and a crisis-and-
aftermath period 2007-2013. We find that the level of banking market development is 
important for reducing firm-level volatility in both periods.  
In further analysis, we examine how national variation in the availability of information 
and the quality of legal infrastructures affects the relationship between the availability of 
long-term credit, as proxied by financial development, and economic volatility. We find that 
better information, indicated by higher accounting standards, mitigates the destabilizing 
influence of limited access to long-term finance. This may reflect that with better information 
the liquidity risk of a pre-mature termination of deserving projects diminishes, as short-term 
creditors will be less likely to refuse to roll over their credits because they cannot accurately 
access the prospects of the project due to lack of information. In addition, we find that better 
legal infrastructures supporting credit markets reduce the economic volatility induced by a 
limited availability of long-term finance, perhaps because lower contract enforcement and 
bankruptcy costs reduce the likelihood of pre-mature liquidation. 
Our evidence of a negative impact of the availability of long-term debt finance on firm 
volatility is robust to controlling for the overall dependence on external finance. Hence, our 
results suggest that changes in financial development that tend to lengthen the maturity of 
credit have a potentially beneficial economic effect in terms of lower economic volatility, 
independently of the overall availability of external finance. 
A large body of papers finds that financial market development, and access to long-term 
financing, have positive growth effects. Among these, Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that 
financial market development causes higher growth of firms in industries with a greater 
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dependence on external finance (see also King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zevros, 1998; 
Beck, Laeven, and Levine, 2000; Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000).2  
Several papers find evidence that macroeconomic stability is positively related to 
financial market development and long-term debt use (see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic, 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Fan, Titman and Twite, 2012).3 
Our contribution to the literature is to examine the relationship between financial market 
development and economic volatility using micro, firm-level data. Our approach enables us 
to examine the relationship between firm-level volatility and the availability of long-term 
debt finance while controlling for the availability of overall external finance in some 
specifications. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the literature 
on the relationship between external finance and economic volatility. In section 3, we 
describe the data underlying the empirical analysis. In section 4 we present empirical results 
on the relationship between the availability of long-term finance and firm-level volatility. 
Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
 
 
2 See Levine (2005) and Beck (2012) for detailed overviews of the literature on finance and growth. Fisman and 
Love (2007) provide evidence that the financial dependence variable in the analysis by Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) proxies for industry-varying global growth opportunities. 
3 Our paper is also related to a recent literature that examines the effects of shocks in the availability of credit on 
firm-level investment. Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) show that the impact of the recent financial crisis on 
corporate investment was greatest for firms with low cash reserves or high short-term debt. Almeida, Campello, 
Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2011) show that firms with a larger fraction of long-term debt maturing 
immediately after the third quarter of 2007 reduced their investment more than firms with longer remaining 
maturities. See also Vermoesen, Deloof and Laveren (2013), Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010), Campello, 
Giambona, Graham and Harvey (2011), Chodorow-Reich (2014), and Duygan-Bump, Levkov and Montoriol-
Garriga (2015).  
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2     The relationship between external finance and economic volatility 
 Theoretically, several papers address the rationale for external debt finance, and how 
it may affect firm volatility. Holmström and Tirole (1997), specifically, reason that financial 
intermediation occurs, because bankers can have a comparative advantage at screening and 
monitoring firms.4 Along these lines, Diamond (1984) analyzes a model where banks have a 
cost advantage of monitoring, if individual savers “delegate” their monitoring to them, 
thereby reducing aggregate monitoring costs. Financial market development potentially 
reduces firm risk taking, if it increases monitoring efficacy of banks and other providers of 
external finance.5  
Short-term creditors are in a relatively better position to monitor and discipline firm risk-
taking, as these creditors can refuse to roll over their credits on short notice, if they conclude 
that the firm is not well-managed (see Rajan, 1992; Rey and Stiglitz, 1993; and Diamond and 
Rajan, 2001). As a consequence of more effective monitoring, external finance that is 
relatively short-term can reduce waste, increase efficiency and lead to lower firm volatility. 
A second channel by which external debt finance may affect firm riskiness is through the 
moral hazard it creates regarding the firm’s risk choice. Shareholders, in particular, have the 
incentive to choose relatively risky activities that are debt-financed, as they will benefit from 
strongly positive outcomes, while they can shift the risk of very negative outcomes to their 
creditors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Increased riskiness due to moral hazard may be more 
pronounced in case of long-term-debt, as this provides shareholders with more time to adjust 
the riskiness of the firm’s activities. 
                                                 
 
 
4 More generally several papers argue that debt finance can be optimal in circumstances where it minimizes 
monitoring costs of firm activity (see Townsend, 1979; Gale and Hellwig, 1985; Boyd and Smith, 1994). 
5  In the case of banks, generous financial safety nets and implicit and explicit bailout guarantees may reduce 
monitoring incentives for bank liability holders and encourage aggressive risk-taking (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Kane, 2002). 
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Through a third channel, external finance potentially increases firm riskiness, as it 
introduces the risk that creditors refuse to roll over their credits before a project can be 
profitably terminated. Diamond (1991) shows that lenders may even face incentives to 
liquidate viable projects. Liquidity risk is greater in the case of short-term debt as it has to be 
renewed relatively frequently. This can explain a preference for long-term debt on the part of 
firms, and increased firm volatility if long-term debt is not available when it is preferable. If 
long-term finance is undersupplied in a country due to reasons such as poor information or 
contract enforcement, firms can either reduce investment in long-term assets or bear 
additional liquidity risk (Aghion et al., 2010). To minimize liquidity risk as well as interest 
rate risk, firms often match the maturity structures of their assets and liabilities (Hart and 
Moore, 1995).6 Limited access to long-term finance inhibits maturity matching when 
investing long-term, possibly resulting in more volatile firm growth and returns. 
In summary, theoretically the relationship between long-term debt finance and firm 
volatility is ambiguous, as long-term debt may reduce firm-level volatility by mitigating 
refinancing risk, while conversely a lower ability to monitor and increased moral hazard may 
lead to greater risk-taking by firms. 
 
3       The data 
In this study, we relate measures of firm-level volatility to firm debt maturity structure. 
The sample consists of firms in all sectors with the exception of financial firms and firms in 
the public sector, as these firms’ capital structure decisions and risk profiles are very different 
from other firms. 
                                                 
 
 
6 For empirical evidence on asset and liability maturity matching by firms, see Schiantarelli and Sembenelli 
(1997), Stohs and Mauer (1996), Jaramillo and Schiantarelli (2002), and Schiantarelli and Srivastava (1997). 
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We use two measures of firm volatility. In particular, we construct Asset volatility 
(book) as the standard deviation of the growth rate of the book value of total assets over the 
1995-2013 period using balance sheet information obtained from the Worldscope database 
(see Table A1 in Appendix A for variable descriptions and data sources). The Asset volatility 
(book) variable reflects investment variability over time. We exclude firms with fewer than 
five asset growth observations, and trim this and other firm-level variables at the 5th and 95th 
percentiles. This yields 24,801 Asset volatility (book) observations with a mean of 0.349, as 
seen in Table 1.  
An alternative volatility variable, Asset volatility (stock), is calculated as the annual 
average of market-based annualized asset value volatility measures based on Merton’s model 
following Anginer et al. (2014).7 We use data from Datastream for the market value of equity 
and to estimate equity volatility. To ensure sufficient variability, we exclude firm-year 
observations with less than 90 days of nonzero stock returns. We further assume that the 
maturity of a firm’s debt is one year, noting that the results are insensitive to this particular 
assumption.8 Finally, the dividend yield is taken from Worldscope, while the risk-free return 
is proxied by the yield on one-year US Treasury bills. Altogether, we have 22,747 Asset 
volatility (stock) observations with a mean of 0.024, as reflected in Table 1. 
Looking at the association between firm volatility and the maturity structure of debt 
can be problematic since the direction of causality can go either way, with less volatile firms 
being able to attract more long-term debt.  We deal with this identification problem by using 
the approach of Rajan and Zingales (1998) to construct a measure of firms’ “desired” debt 
                                                 
 
 
7 See Appendix A1 of Anginer et al. (2014) for a description of Merton’s method to calculate firms’ asset 
volatility. 
8 We checked the robustness of this assumption by changing the assumed maturity of one year to the firm-
specific weighted average of the maturities of short-term debt and long-term debt approximated to 0.5 and 2 
years, respectively. The estimated coefficients and standard errors in the regressions of Table 2 change only 
slightly (unreported). 
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maturity structure. This index, Maturity, is given by the use of long-term finance for sectors 
in the US on the assumption that firms in the US are not as constrained in their choice of 
short-term vs. long-term external finance. Specifically, Maturity is computed as the sectoral 
median of the firm-level average long-term debt to total debt ratio over 1995-2013 for US 
firms in each three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) sector.  
Variation in Maturity across sectors reflects that firm preferences for long-term finance 
may differ for a variety of reasons. For example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) 
find that the long-term debt ratio is positively related to the ratio of fixed assets to total assets 
as evidence that firms try to match the maturity of their assets and liabilities. Furthermore, 
they find that the long-term debt ratio is negatively related to profitability as firms that are 
more profitable may be better off financing their investments through retained earnings. In 
addition, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) also find that long-term debt use is 
positively related to firm size as proxied by total assets which could reflect that bigger firms 
are less risky or that they have found better ways to limit the potential for moral hazard 
associated with more long-term finance. The Maturity variable has a mean of 0.764. 
Analogously to Rajan and Zingales (1998), the volatility regressions include an 
interaction of the Maturity variable with a financial development variable that reflects the 
financial depth of the country where the firm is located. Five financial development variables 
are considered.9 First, Private credit reflects domestic credit provided by banks to the private 
sector as a percentage of GDP, with a mean of 0.874. Second, Domestic credit is domestic 
credit provided by the financial sector (including monetary authorities, banks, and other 
financial corporations) as a percentage of GDP, with a mean of 1.141. Third, Capitalization is 
                                                 
 
 
9 We restrict the sample to the years 1995-2013, as availability of the financial development variables before 
1995 is limited. Financial development variables are for the year 1995 to reduce concerns about the endogeneity 
of these variables. 
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the sum of Domestic credit and the stock market valuation of all listed companies as a 
percentage of GDP. The mean of the Capitalization variable is 1.799. Fourth, Bonds is debt 
securities issued by all issuers as a percentage of GDP, and has a mean of 0.104. Finally, 
Total capitalization is the sum of Capitalization and Bonds with a mean of 1.898. Data on 
credit aggregates and overall stock market valuation are from the World Development 
Indicators database, while data for the bonds variable are from the debt securities database of 
the Bank of International Settlements (BIS).  
As additional control variables, in some specifications we also interact the financial 
development proxies with a measure of firms’ dependence on external finance. Analogously 
to Maturity, we construct the desired dependence on external finance variable, DEF, for each 
US sector as the share of financing of capital expenditures that cannot be covered by the 
operating cash flow, i.e. as (capital expenditures – operating cash flow)/capital expenditures, 
on the assumption that firms in the US are not constrained in their external financing. 
Specifically, DEF is the sectoral median of the firm-level average value of (capital 
expenditure - operating cashflow)/capital expenditure over the 1995-2013 period for US 
firms in a three-digit SIC sector.10 In Table 1 we see that DEF has a mean of 0.100. 
In addition, we examine how the relationship between the firm volatility variables and 
Maturity depends on several indices of institutional quality. These institutional indices 
measure the ease and cost of credit transactions in a certain country, and therefore might 
influence refinancing risk.  
Accounting is a measure of accounting standards and captures the quality of 
information available on the firm. Such transparency may matter, as it enables debt holders to 
                                                 
 
 
10 To calculate DEF, we exclude firms with fewer than ten years of observed book value of assets to ensure that 
we calculate this variable over a relatively extended period of capital expenditures and operating cash flows. 
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monitor firms better. Also, better quality information may reduce the perceived need for 
creditors to refuse to roll over their credits due to limited information on the firm. Accounting 
is an index of the disclosure standards for listed firms in a given country, compiled by the 
Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). Specifically, the 
Accounting variable informs on the presence, or absence, of 85 items in the annual reports of 
large publicly traded companies in 1993. The mean number of reported items is 72.71, as 
reported in Table 1. 
Next, Getting credit is a measure of how easy it is to get credit as of 2006, with higher 
values of this variable meaning easier access to credit. The Getting credit variable reflects the 
existence of collateral and bankruptcy laws that facilitate lending as well as the coverage, 
scope and accessibility of credit information, for instance, through credit registries and credit 
bureaus. Greater ease of getting credit is expected to reduce a firm’s liquidity risk. The 
Getting credit index is available from the Doing Business database of the World Bank.11 
In addition, Contract enforcement measures the time and cost of resolving a 
commercial dispute through a local first-instance court in the year 2006, with higher values 
reflecting better enforcement. Faster and cheaper resolution of disputes is expected to 
facilitate lending, which should be especially important for firms that are more reliant on 
short-term debt financing as these firms have to refinance their debts more frequently.  
Further, the Resolving insolvency index measures the time, cost and outcome of 
insolvency proceedings as well as the strength of the legal framework applicable to 
liquidation and reorganization proceedings in 2006, with higher values indicating a more 
efficient bankruptcy resolution. A more efficient framework for resolving insolvency is 
                                                 
 
 
11 This variable is available only from 2006. 
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expected to reduce refinancing risk, as the suppliers of short-term credit potentially have to 
rely on insolvency proceedings more frequently to ensure partial or full credit repayment. 
A final measure of institutional quality is the Government effectiveness index, which 
captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures in 1996. Higher values of this variable 
indicate greater government effectiveness. Government effectiveness is important for private 
sector efficiency. Hence, this variable is an indication of how efficiently private credit 
transactions can be completed. Greater government effectiveness is expected to reduce the 
costs and risks associated with especially short-term credit, as short-term financing implies a 
sequence of refinancing transactions. The Government effectiveness index is available from 
the World Governance Indicators database of the World Bank. 
Tables A2 –A4 in Appendix A provide additional information about our sample of 
firms. Table A2 shows that firms are fairly evenly distributed across countries. The largest 
numbers of 4,225 and 2,269 firms are located in Japan and the United Kingdom, respectively, 
in an overall sample of 30,059 firms. Table A3 shows that firms represent a range of 
industries at the 2-digit SIC level, with no industry comprising more than 10% of all firms. 
Furthermore, Table A4 provides summary statistics of all firm-level variables separately for 
firms located in developing and high-income countries separately based on World Bank 
classification in 1995. The table shows that firms located in high-income countries have 
higher levels of financial development, and also better institutions as measured by the various 
indices used in this study. 
To conclude this section, Figure 1 plots the average ratio of long-term debt to total 
assets over the 1995-2013 period as a proxy of long-term finance separately for firms located 
in developing and in high-income countries according to World Bank classification in 1995. 
Long-term debt use in developing countries has generally been lower than in high-income 
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countries, possibly reflecting greater macroeconomic instability and less developed 
institutional frameworks. The long-term debt to assets ratio declined in both developed and 
developing countries between 1995 and 2013, and it was relatively low in 2007 and 2008 in 
the two sets of countries at the time of the worldwide financial crisis.  
 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Methodology 
We examine the relationship between firm-level asset volatility and the availability of 
long-term finance as affected by a country’s financial development. Our identifying 
assumption is that corporate preferences for long-term finance differ at the industry level 
globally. As a proxy for these preferences, we take the observed maturity variable at the 
industry level in the US. Industry-level variation in maturity in the US is assumed to be a 
good index of firms’ preferences for longer-term finance everywhere, as US financial 
markets are relatively well developed. Specifically, we estimate the following model for an 
international sample of firms: 
Asset volatilityijk = αj + αk + β0Developmentj × Maturityk + ϵi (1) 
 
where Asset volatilityijk is firm i’s asset volatility (either Asset volatility (book) or Asset 
volatility (stock)), Developmentj is a proxy for country j’s financial development (either 
Private credit, Domestic credit, Capitalization, Bonds or Total Capitalization), and Maturityk 
is the average maturity variable for US firms in industry k. Equation (1) includes country 
fixed effects, αj, and industry fixed effects, αk, to control for unobserved country-level and 
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industry-level determinants of asset volatility.12 We report standard errors that allow for 
clustering at the country-industry level.  
 A higher level of financial development, indicated by the Developmentj variable, 
should increase the availability of external long-term finance. The interaction term 
Developmentj * Maturityk is an index of the impact of financial development on firms’ take-
up of long-term finance, as greater financial development is assumed to increase long-term 
finance relatively more at firms in industries with greater preferences of long-term debt. The 
parameter β0 measures the impact of financial development on firm asset volatility through a 
greater availability of long-term finance. As discussed in section 2, the impact of long-term 
finance on firm-level economic volatility is theoretically ambiguous, and therefore also β0 
can be either positive or negative.  
A negative estimate of  β0 suggests that a greater availability of long-term debt 
reduces firm volatility, as it reduces the financing risks associated with short-term debt. 
Short-term debt is relatively risky, as short-term creditors can refuse to roll over their 
financing implying liquidity risk, or alternatively the cost of short-term funding can be 
relatively variable implying interest rate risk. Our tests do not enable us to distinguish to what 
extent the refinancing risks associated with short-term debt encompass liquidity risk or 
interest rate risk.13 Instead, a negative estimate of  β0 suggests that there are refinancing risks 
generally associated with short-term debt, where the term refinancing risk refers to both 
liquidity and interest rate risk. Conversely, a positive estimate of β0 would suggest that 
greater access to long-term debt on net increases firm volatility, as long-term debt reduces 
                                                 
 
 
12 The Developmentj and Maturityk variables are subsumed by the country and industry fixed effects, 
respectively. 
13 To be able to distinguish between liquidity risk and interest rate risk, we would need data on whether firms 
refinance their short-term debts and at what interest rates. These data are not available. 
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effective risk monitoring by creditors and enhances moral hazard regarding risk choices for 
firms.  
We also consider how variation in information availability and legal infrastructures 
across countries affects the relationship between firm volatility and the availability of longer-
term finance as proxied by financial development. In particular, we estimate the following 
model: 
Asset volatilityijk
= αj + αk +  β0Developmentj × Maturityk
+ β1Qualityj × Maturityk
+ β2Qualityj × Developmentj × Maturity𝑘 + ϵi 
(2) 
 
where Qualityj is an index of country j’s institutional quality (either Accounting, Getting 
credit, Contract enforcement, Resolving insolvency, or Government effectiveness). A 
negative estimated coefficient  β2 for the triple interaction term Qualityj * Develpomentj * 
Maturityk in (2) is evidence that a greater availability of long-term finance reduces firm-level 
asset volatility relatively much in countries with better institutions, and vice versa.  
In subsection 4.2 we present the results of estimating model (1) for an international 
sample of firms based on data for the years 1995-2013. Subsection 4.3 provides separate 
estimates of (1) for the pre-crisis period 1995-2006, and for the crisis and subsequent period 
2007-2013, and it examines how the relationship between firm-level volatility and the 
availability of long-term finance is affected by firm age and internationalization. In 
subsection 4.4, we provide estimates of model (2) to examine the impact of institutional 
quality on the relationship between firm volatility and the availability of long-term finance. 
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4.2 Basic results 
The basic results of estimating model (1) for the variables Asset volatility (book) and 
Asset volatility (stock) variables are presented in Panels A and B of Table 2, respectively. 
Each panel contains 5 regressions that each includes an interaction term of a different 
financial development variable (Private credit, Domestic credit, Capitalization, Bonds, or 
Total capitalization) with Maturity.  
In the Asset volatility (book) regression 1 of Panel A of Table 2, the estimated 
coefficient of the interaction term of private credit and maturity is negative at -0.0554, and it 
is significant at the 1% level. A greater reliance on long-term finance may lower asset growth 
volatility by reducing the refinancing risk associated with the need to continually roll over 
short-term credit. In columns 2-5, the interactions of maturity with domestic credit, 
capitalization, bonds, and total capitalization similarly obtain negative estimated coefficients 
of -0.0500, -0.0179, -0.0532 and -0.0181, respectively, that are statistically significant at least 
at the 10% level.  
In Panel B of Table 2, we present analogous regressions where asset volatility (stock) is 
the dependent variable. The interaction terms in all five regressions obtain negative 
coefficients that are statistically significant at least at the 5% level. Overall, the results of 
Table 2 suggest that firms with a preference for more long-term finance, for instance on 
account of having more fixed assets, are able to achieve lower firm volatility in countries 
with better developed financial markets as greater access to long-term finance lowers 
refinancing risk.14 
                                                 
 
 
14 In robustness checks we re-estimated the regressions in Table 2 for a sample that excludes the years 1995-
1998 since Worldscope covers fewer firms around the beginning of our sample. The results suggest that the 
composition of the sample does not bias our results. In the unreported regressions, all ten estimated coefficients 
are negative and significant at least at the 10% level. Moreover, the magnitudes of the coefficients are similar to 
those in Table 2. In a further robustness test, we changed the base year for the financial development proxies 
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The estimated coefficients in Table 2 can be used to ascertain the impact of financial 
market development on the volatility of firms with different industry-level maturity variables. 
In particular, using the estimated coefficient of -0.0554 in regression 1 in Panel A, we see 
that an increase in the Private credit variable by one standard deviation (0.504 from Table 1) 
reduces Asset volatility (book) by 0.084(=0.0554*0.504/0.332) standard deviations more for 
a firm in a (hypothetical) industry with Maturity = 1 relative to a firm in an industry with 
Maturity = 0. More realistically, we can compare two firms in different industries with a 
difference in mean maturities of 2 standard deviations, or 0.250(=2*0.125) from Table 1. The 
one standard deviation increase in Private credit of 0.0554 then reduces Asset volatility 
(book) 0.021 (=0.084*0.25) standard deviations more for a firm in the high-maturity industry 
vs. the low-maturity industry.15  
Our finding that financial market development reduces volatility relatively more for 
firms in industries with longer maturities suggests that financial development serves to 
reduce constraints on the availability of longer-term finance which enables firms to reduce 
their volatility. The estimation of Table 2, however, does not inform on the overall volatility 
effect of financial market development for any particular firm, say the firm with average 
maturity. This effect for any one firm cannot be inferred from the regression output in Table 
2, as the financial development variable itself is subsumed in the country fixed effects, and 
hence is not estimated. We include these country fixed effects in the regressions, as we wish 
to control for any relevant, but not included country characteristics (beyond financial 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
 
from 1995 to 2000, and then re-estimated all regressions of Table 2 based on data for the period of 2000-2013. 
The unreported results can be summarized as follows. In nine of the ten regressions we obtain negative 
coefficients for the interactions between maturity and the included financial development proxy that in eight 
cases are significant at the 5% level. These coefficients have similar magnitudes to those reported in Table 2. In 
one case we obtain a positive, insignificant coefficient. 
15 An analogous calculation based on the estimated coefficient of -0.00274 in regression 1 of Panel B yields that 
a one standard deviation increase in Private credit of 0.0554 reduces Asset volatility (stock) by 0.030 standard 
deviations more for a firm in the high-maturity industry vs. the low-maturity industry. 
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development) while estimating the differential impact of financial development on firms in 
high-maturity vs. low-maturity industries.  
Naturally, the overall effect of financial development (not just coming through its 
interaction with maturity) on firm volatility is of interest. Therefore, we re-estimate the 
regressions of Table 2 without the country fixed effects so that the financial development 
variables can be included in the estimation. The resulting table is reported in Appendix B.  
These additional results, as discussed in the appendix, suggest that financial development per 
se reduces firm volatility, especially for firms in industries with longer maturities.  
Financial development is likely to differentially affect firms with a greater dependence 
on long-term finance as well as firms with a greater dependence on external financial 
generally. To check whether long-term external finance has an impact on firm risk 
independently of overall external finance, we next re-estimate the regressions in Table 2, 
while adding an interaction of the included financial development variable with DEF, 
proxying for the dependence on overall external finance, as an additional control variable. 
The results are reported in Table 3. 
In the Asset volatility (book) regression 1 of panel A of Table 3, the interaction of 
private credit with maturity obtains a negative coefficient of -0.0579 that is significant at the 
1% level, while the interaction of private credit with DEF obtains a positive and insignificant 
coefficient. These results suggest that financial deepening reduces firm volatility through a 
lengthening of external debt maturity, rather than through a greater availability of external 
finance more generally. In regressions 2 to 5, the included interactions of a financial 
development proxy with maturity similarly obtain negative coefficients that are significant, 
except for the interaction of bonds with maturity in column 4. The interactions involving 
DEF are positive and insignificant, except for regression 5, where the interaction of total 
capitalization with DEF obtains a positive coefficient that is significant at 10%. The latter 
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result suggests that financial deepening leads to higher firm risk insofar as it increases the 
availability of external finance generally. Additional external finance may increase firm risk, 
as it accentuates moral hazard regarding the firm’s risk choices and as it increases refinancing 
risk. 
Similar results obtain in panel B of Table 3, in which asset volatility (book) is replaced 
by asset volatility (stock) as dependent variable. The included interactions of a financial 
development variable with maturity obtain negative and significant coefficients in all five 
regressions, while the interactions of the financial development variable with DEF are 
estimated with positive and significant coefficients in regressions 1, 4 and 5. 
Overall, the results of Table 3 suggest that a greater availability of long-term external 
finance reduces firm volatility even if we control for the availability of external finance 
generally. As a main potential explanation, long-term finance may reduce firm risk as it 
mitigates refinancing risk. In contrast, there is some evidence that greater availability of 
external finance appears to lead to higher firm risk. This could reflect that use of overall 
external finance enhances firms’ risk-shifting incentives and augments refinancing risks. 
4.3 The crisis period, and heterogeneity in firm age and internationalization 
 In this subsection, we examine whether the relationships between financial 
development and firm volatility were different following the recent economic and financial 
crisis. In addition, we consider whether these relationships are different depending on firm-
level age and internationalization. 
 The impact of long-term debt finance on firm stability can be expected to be 
especially pronounced during and immediately after a financial crisis. Specifically, negative 
asset growth and asset valuation outcomes associated with prior risk choices on the part of 
the firm, and also refinancing problems, are more likely to materialize during an economic 
and financial crisis. To investigate this, we split the sample into a pre-crisis period 1995-
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2006, and a crisis period and its aftermath 2007-2013. Specifically, we calculate our firm 
volatility measures separately for these two periods, and then re-estimate the regressions of 
Table 2 for the two subsamples. The results for the pre-crisis period, and the crisis period and 
its aftermath are reported in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. 
 In Panel A of Table 4 with pre-crisis regressions, asset volatility (book) is negatively 
and significantly related to the interactions of maturity with private credit and domestic 
credit, respectively. This suggests that long-term finance had a mitigating impact on firm risk 
also in the pre-crisis period. In the other three regressions of Panel A, however, the included 
interactions of a financial development variable with maturity are not estimated to be 
significant. 
Panel B also shows some, but a limited impact of the availability of long-term finance 
on firm volatility in the pre-crisis period. In particular, the interaction of domestic credit with 
maturity obtains a negative and significant coefficient in column 2, while all other interaction 
terms are estimated to be insignificant. 
In Panel A of Table 5 for the years 2007-2013, we see that asset volatility (book) is 
negatively related to the included interaction terms in all five regressions, and that the 
estimated coefficients are statistically significant in all cases except for the interaction of 
bonds with maturity in column 4. In Panel B with asset volatility (stock) regressions, a 
similar picture emerges, as the estimated coefficients for the included interaction terms are all 
negative, and statistically significant.  Overall, the results of Table 6 show a clear negative 
relationship between reliance on long-term debt and firm volatility during the crisis and its 
aftermath.  
Comparing the results of Tables 4 and 5, we see that the interaction of bonds with 
maturity is significant in Panel B of Table 5 but in neither of the panels of Table 4. This 
could mean that the availability of bond finance only has a positive impact on firm stability 
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during a crisis period, since the alternative, long-term bank finance, tends to be more limited 
during these periods. This is consistent with evidence in Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2012), and 
Becker and Ivashina (2014) that although bank loans decline during a financial crisis, bond 
financing actually increases to make up part of the gap. For other variables, across Tables 5 
and 6 significantly estimated coefficients of similar magnitude arise in several instances. For 
example, the estimated coefficient for the interaction of private credit with maturity is -
0.0348 in regression 1 of Panel A of Table 4 and significant at 10%, while it is -0.0338 in the 
corresponding regression in Table 5 and significant at 5%. In this case, it appears that the 
expected impact of the availability of long-term finance on firm volatility is similar in pre-
crisis and crisis periods, even though the impact of long-term finance on firm volatility may 
be more difficult to estimate during the more tranquil pre-crisis period.16 
Next, we examine how the relationship between firm-level asset volatility and the 
availability of long term finance varies with firm age. The negative estimated relationships 
between asset volatility and the availability of long-term finance in Table 2 could possibly 
reflect that older firms use more long-term finance, as they have easier access to this type of 
finance, while at the same time they have less volatile assets. To control for firm age, we split 
the overall sample into two subsamples containing firms in sectors in which the average firm 
age in the US is below and above the median firm age, respectively. We then re-estimate the 
regressions of Table 2 separately for the two subsamples. 
Table 6 shows results for the subsample of firms in industries with younger firms. 
Estimated coefficients in both Panels A and B are negative in all regressions. In addition, 
they are statistically significant throughout with the exception of the regressions that include 
                                                 
 
 
16 We tested if survivorship bias drives our results, but found no indication of this. In particular, we re-estimated 
all regressions in Tables 4 and 5 for the sample of firms that were active in both the 1995-2006, and 2007-2013 
periods. We found qualitatively and quantitatively similar results to those reported. 
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the interaction Bonds * Maturity. Table 7 shows analogous results for the subsample of firms 
in industries with older firms. Estimated coefficients in all regressions are negative except in 
the Asset volatility (stock) regression 3 in Panel B that includes the interaction Capitalization 
* Maturity. In addition, estimated coefficients are significant in the Asset volatility (book) 
regressions 1 and 2, including the Private credit * Maturity and Domestic credit * Maturity 
interactions, and in the Asset volatility (stock) regressions 2 and 4 that include the Domestic 
credit * Maturity and Bonds * Maturity interaction. 
The overall negative and significant estimated coefficients in both Tables 6 and 7 
suggest that the negative relationships between asset volatility and the availability of long 
term finance found in Table 2 cannot be attributed to the distinction between younger and 
older firms. A comparison of Tables 6 and 7 further shows that estimated coefficients in 
Table 6 for the sample of younger firms are more negative than in Table 7 for the sample of 
older firms. Hence, financial market development reduces the volatility of older firms in 
industries that tend to rely more on long-term finance in the US relatively little. Potential 
explanations for this are that older firms may have easier access to long-term finance even in 
countries with lower levels of financial development on account of their established 
reputations, or perhaps that they can more easily substitute retained earnings for external 
long-term finance. 
To conclude this subsection, we consider the implications of firm internationalization 
for the relationship between the availability of long-term finance, as proxied by financial 
development, and firm asset volatility. Firms that are part of multinational corporations could 
on average have more long-term finance as they can benefit from an internal capital market 
within the firm, while at the same time they could display less asset volatility if being part of 
a multinational firm reduces the variability in the book and market valuation of assets. To 
control for this possible source of endogeneity, we split the overall sample into two 
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subsamples based on whether firms are in industries where US firms on average have a 
foreign assets to total assets ratio below and above the median, respectively. For both 
subsamples we find results that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the results in 
Table 2, which are not reported. These findings suggest that the results reported in Table 2 
cannot be attributed to the distinction between low-internationalization and high-
internationalization firms.17 
4.4 The role of institutional quality 
In this section, we present the results of estimating model (2) to determine how 
information and legal infrastructures affect the relationship between the availability of long-
term finance and firm-level volatility. To start, as a proxy for the availability of information 
we employ accounting standards. Greater transparency increases creditors’ ability to monitor 
the firm, and hence is expected to reduce the firm’s ability to engage in risk-shifting. This 
suggests that higher accounting standards should attenuate the tendency of external financing 
to increase firm volatility (as evident from Table 3). In addition, more transparency may 
reduce refinancing risk, as it should reduce the probability that creditors refuse to roll over 
their credits for lack of reliable data on the firm.  
The beneficial effects of greater transparency in reducing the tendency of external 
finance to contribute to firm volatility should be especially pronounced in the case of short-
term debt, as more transparency particularly strengthens the ability of short-term creditors to 
monitor and discipline the firm’s risk-taking. Also, short-term credit needs to be continually 
rolled over, and hence good information is particularly important in the case of short-term 
                                                 
 
 
17 As an additional robustness tests, we re-estimated the regressions of Table 2 for the sample of listed firms, 
and we estimated weighted regressions analogous to those of Table 2 using weights calculated as the inverse of 
the number of firms in a country-industry over the total number of firms. Both sets of regressions yield results 
that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those in Table 2 (unreported). Finally, we considered whether 
variation in government ownership might drive our results. This is unlikely to be the case, since only about 
0.5% of the firms in our sample are categorized by Worldscope as having majority government ownership. 
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credit in preventing credit-worthy projects from not being refinanced because of poor quality 
information. For these reasons, with higher accounting standards we expect an increase in 
firm debt maturity to be associated with a relatively smaller reduction in volatility.  
Table 8 shows regressions that investigate the role of accounting standards in affecting 
the relationship between access to long-term debt finance and firm volatility. Specifically, 
taking the specifications in Table 2, these regressions include triple interaction terms of a 
financial market development variable, Maturity, and Accounting. 
In Panel A of Table 8, the dependent variable is asset volatility (book). In all five 
regressions, the included triple interaction terms obtain positive coefficients that are 
significant in regressions 1, 3, 4 and 5. In these four regressions, the double interaction terms 
of the included financial development variable and maturity obtain negative and significant 
coefficients. In the asset volatility (stock) regressions of panel B, we find that the triple 
interaction of bonds, maturity and accounting receives a positive and significant coefficient in 
regression 4, while the double interaction of bonds and maturity loads with a negative and 
significant coefficient in this regression. These results support the hypothesis that shorter 
maturity tends to increase firm volatility less in environments with better information, since 
with better information, pre-mature liquidation of deserving projects happens less frequently 
and the use of short-term debt increases liquidity risk less.   
Next, in Table 9 we consider the role of the Getting credit variable, as an index of legal 
infrastructure that facilitates getting credit and of the existence of credit registries and credit 
bureaus. In the asset volatility (book) regressions of Panel A, the triple interactions of a 
financial market variable, Maturity and Getting credit receive positive coefficients that are 
statistically significant in regressions 3-5. The double interactions of Maturity and Getting 
credit obtain negative and significant coefficients in these regressions. These results suggest 
that with easier access to credit financial market development – implying greater availability 
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of long-term debt - reduces asset growth volatility relatively less for firms with a preference 
for long-term debt. This implies that firms’ refinancing risks that are being alleviated by a 
greater availability of long-term debt are lower in case they have easier access to credit.18  
In the asset volatility (stock) regressions Panel B of Table 9, triple interactions 
involving Getting credit obtain positive and significant coefficients, while the corresponding 
double interactions receive negative and significant coefficients.  This is further evidence that 
the ability of get credit easily reduces the negative volatility consequences of a lack of 
financial market development and long-term finance. 
Next, in Table 10 we consider regressions that include the Contract enforcement 
variable, which is an index of the time and cost of resolving a commercial dispute through a 
first-instance court. In the asset volatility (book) regressions of Panel A, the triple interactions 
of a financial development variable, Maturity, and Contract enforcement are estimated with 
insignificant coefficients. In the asset volatility (stock) regressions in Panel B, these triple 
interactions instead receive positive coefficients that are statistically significant, while the 
corresponding double interactions are estimated with negative and significant coefficients. 
Easier contract enforcement thus appears to reduce the volatility benefits of financial 
development that facilitates long-term credit, as easier contract enforcement reduces volatility 
especially for firms with a preference for short-term credit. This may reflect that short-term 
creditors may be more patient and more likely to refinance their credits in countries with 
more efficient contract enforcement, which reduces the refinancing risk associated with 
short-term financing. 
                                                 
 
 
18 The Getting credit variable particularly addresses the ease of access to credit. Hence, these results suggest 
that the refinancing risks that are being alleviated by a greater availability of long-term debt at least in part 
reflect a lower liquidity risk, i.e. risk related to the quantity of the refinancing rather than its price. 
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The regressions of Table 11 include triple and double interaction terms of the 
Resolving insolvency variable which measures the time, cost, and outcome of insolvency 
proceedings. The triple interactions are estimated with insignificant coefficients in the asset 
volatility (book) regressions of Panel A, while they receive positive and significant 
coefficients in asset volatility (stock) regressions 3 and 5 of Panel B. This provides some 
evidence that more efficient bankruptcy resolution reduces the refinancing risks of short-term 
debt.   
Finally, we consider the Government effectiveness variable as an overall measure of 
the effectiveness of public policies and governance, with the results reported in Table 12. In 
the asset volatility (book) regression 4 in Panel A, the interaction of Bonds with Maturity and 
Government effectiveness obtains a positive and significant coefficient, while the double 
interaction Bonds * Maturity obtains a negative and significant coefficient in this regression. 
In panel B, we obtain positive and significant coefficients for the triple interactions of Private 
credit, Capitalization and Total capitalization with Maturity and Government effectiveness in 
asset volatility (book) regressions 1, 3 and 5, while the corresponding double interactions 
obtain negative and significant coefficients. These results suggest that more effective 
government policies reduce the negative impact of short-term debt on firm volatility, again 
potentially reflecting the greater patience of short-term creditors in dealing with debtors when 
they are more confident that their rights are protected in a better institutional environment. 
The reduced likelihood of pre-mature liquidation decreases the refinancing risk associated 
with short-term financing.  
Overall, the results of this section suggest that the negative volatility consequences of a 
lack of financial development implying reduced access to long-term finance are attenuated in 
countries with high-quality information and legal infrastructures as these reduce the potential 
for short-term credit to add to firm-level volatility. 
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5 Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between access to long-term debt finance and 
economic volatility at the firm level. Using an approach similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998), 
we find that for firms with a greater demand for long-term debt, a greater availability of long-
term debt finance, as proxied by different measures of financial development, reduces firm 
volatility. This could reflect that a greater availability of long-term finance mitigates the 
refinancing risks associated with the requirement to continually roll over short-term credit.  
Investigating the period before and after the global financial crisis separately, we see that 
the negative impact of the availability of long-term bank finance on firm volatility holds for 
the full sample of 1995-2013.  However, when we proxy financial development by bond 
market development, we see that the contribution of bond market development to reducing 
firm volatility is only found in the later period, perhaps because bond finance can be 
substituted to make up for the reduction in long-term bank finance during crisis periods.  
Further, we show that adequate information availability and a high-quality contracting 
environment supporting credit markets reduce the negative implication for firm volatility of 
limited access to long-term debt, as these factors mitigate the refinancing risks associated 
with short-term debt. In particular, the refinancing risks associated with short-term finance 
appear to be lower if accounting standards are high, if legal institutions support access to 
credit, contract enforcement and efficient insolvency resolution, and if the government 
operates effectively. 
Our evidence of a negative relationship between the availability of long-term debt 
finance on firm volatility is robust to controlling for overall dependence on external finance. 
Hence, our results suggest that changes in financial development that lengthen the maturity of 
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credit have a potentially beneficial economic effect in terms of lower economic volatility, 
independently of the overall availability of external finance. For this reason, countries with 
limited availability of long-term debt finance resulting from market failures and policy 
weaknesses can benefit from policies that could increase its supply. Promoting 
macroeconomic and political stability, improving the information infrastructure, 
strengthening legal institutions including investor protection, and creating a contestable 
banking system that is adequately supervised and regulated may be effective policies in this 
regard. 
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Appendix A. Data description 
 
Table A1: Variable descriptions and data sources 
 
Variable Description Source 
Asset volatility (book) Standard deviation of the growth rate of the book value of total 
assets. 
Worldscope 
Asset volatility (stock) Volatility of the value of a firm's assets calculated based on 
Merton's model, averaged over time. 
Worldscope, 
Datastream 
Maturity Median of the average value over 1995-2013 of the ratio of long-
term debt to total debt for US firms in a three-digit sector in the 
Standard Industrial Classification system. 
Worldscope 
DEF Median of the average value over 1995-2013 of (capital 
expenditure - operating cashflow)/capital expenditure for US 
firms in a three-digit sector in the Standard Industrial 
Classification system. 
Worldscope 
Private credit Domestic credit to the private sector by banks (% of GDP) as of 
year-end 1995. Domestic credit to the private sector by banks 
refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by 
deposit taking corporations except central banks, such as through 
loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and 
other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment. For 
some countries these claims include credit to public enterprises. 
WDI 
Domestic credit Domestic credit provided by the financial sector (% of GDP) as of 
year-end 1995. Domestic credit provided by the financial sector 
includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the 
exception of credit to the central government, which is net. The 
financial sector includes monetary authorities and deposit money 
banks, as well as other financial corporations where data are 
available (including corporations that do not accept transferable 
deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits). 
WDI 
Capitalization Domestic credit and the market capitalization of listed companies 
(% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. 
WDI 
Bonds Debt securities issued by all issuers (% of GDP) as of year-end 
1995. 
BIS, WDI 
Total capitalization Sum of Capitalization and Bonds. BIS, WDI 
Accounting Index of accounting standards in 1993. Higher values indicate 
more disclosure in firms' annual reports. 
CIFAR 
Getting credit Index of the legal rights of borrowers and lenders that facilitate 
lending and a better availability of credit information in 2006 
Higher values indicate easier access to credit. 
Doing Business 
Contract enforcement Index measuring the time and cost of resolving a commercial 
dispute through a local first-instance court in 2006. Higher values 
indicate easier contract enforcement. 
Doing Business 
Resolving insolvency Index measuring the time, cost and outcome of insolvency 
proceedings involving domestic entities as well as the strength of 
the legal framework applicable to liquidation and reorganization 
proceedings in 2006. Higher values indicate more efficient 
bankruptcy resolution.  
Doing Business 
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Government 
effectiveness 
Index capturing perceptions of th quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies in 1996. Higher values indicate more 
effective government policies. 
World 
Governance 
Indicators 
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Table A2: Number of firms by country 
 
The table shows the number of firms in the sample by country. Countries are group into developing and high-
income countries based on World Bank classification in 1995. Developing countries include low-income and 
middle-income countries. 
 
High-income country Number of 
firms 
  Developing country Number of 
firms 
Australia 1,557 
 
Argentina 108 
Austria 125 
 
Brazil 474 
Belgium 157 
 
Chile 192 
Bermuda 46 
 
China 3,084 
Canada 1,637 
 
Colombia 60 
Denmark 192 
 
Czech Republic 57 
Finland 177 
 
Greece 339 
France 1,094 
 
Hungary 54 
Germany 1,025 
 
India 2,270 
Hong Kong 1,043 
 
Indonesia 374 
Ireland 98 
 
Malaysia 1,052 
Israel 421 
 
Mexico 204 
Italy 346 
 
Pakistan 206 
Japan 4,225 
 
Peru 109 
Korea, Republic of  1,874  Philippines 171 
Liechtenstein 1 
 
Poland 440 
Luxembourg 51 
 
Russian Federation 591 
Netherlands 296 
 
South Africa 470 
New Zealand 143 
 
Sri Lanka 162 
Norway 299 
 
Thailand 523 
Portugal 92 
 
Turkey 279 
Singapore 706 
 
  
Spain 177 
   Sweden 528 
   Switzerland 261 
   United Kingdom 2,269 
   
     Total high-income 
countries 
18,840 
 
Total developing 
countries 
11,219 
           Total 30,059 
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Table A3: Number of firms by industry 
 
The table shows the number of firms in each 2-digit SIC sector in the sample. 
 
Industry 
code 
Name of  sector 
Number of 
firms 
1 Agricultural Production - Crops 179 
2 Agricultural Production - Livestock and Animal Specialties 84 
7 Agricultural Services 44 
8 Forestry 31 
10 Metal Mining 968 
12 Coal Mining 180 
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 953 
14 Mining and Quarrying of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 50 
15 Construction - General Contractors & Operative Builders 955 
16 Heavy Construction, Except Building Construction, Contractor 514 
17 Construction - Special Trade Contractors 141 
20 Food and Kindred Products 1,481 
21 Tobacco Products 37 
22 Textile Mill Products 563 
23 Apparel, Finished Products from Fabrics & Similar Materials 341 
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 195 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 155 
26 Paper and Allied Products 463 
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 421 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 2,207 
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 176 
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 418 
31 Leather and Leather Products 102 
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 640 
33 Primary Metal Industries 1,026 
34 Fabricated Metal Products 685 
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 1,665 
36 Electronic & Other Electrical Equipment & Components 2,100 
37 Transportation Equipment 855 
38 Measuring, Photographic, Medical, & Optical Goods, & Clocks 789 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 243 
40 Railroad Transportation 44 
41 Local & Suburban Transit & Interurban Highway Transportation 54 
42 Motor Freight Transportation 211 
44 Water Transportation 385 
45 Transportation by Air 206 
46 Pipelines, Except Natural Gas 9 
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47 Transportation Services 162 
48 Communications 822 
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 946 
50 Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 1,014 
51 Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods 646 
52 Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supplies & Mobile Homes 48 
53 General Merchandise Stores 236 
54 Food Stores 224 
55 Automotive Dealers and Gasoline Service Stations 127 
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 222 
57 Home Furniture, Furnishings and Equipment Stores 193 
58 Eating and Drinking Places 306 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 357 
70 Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, and Other Lodging Places 366 
72 Personal Services 62 
73 Business Services 2,927 
75 Automotive Repair, Services and Parking 54 
76 Miscellaneous Repair Services 18 
78 Motion Pictures 220 
79 Amusement and Recreation Services 278 
80 Health Services 215 
81 Legal Services 2 
82 Educational Services 118 
83 Social Services 27 
84 Museums, Art Galleries and Botanical and Zoological Gardens 1 
87 Engineering, Accounting, Research, and Management Services 792 
89 Services, Not Elsewhere Classified 106 
  Total 30,059 
 
 
  
36 
 
Table A4: Summary statistics by country income status 
 
The table shows summary statistics separately for firms residing in developing and high-income countries based 
on World Bank classification in 1995. Developing countries include low-income and middle-income countries. 
Asset volatility (book) is the standard deviation of the growth rate of the book value of total assets over the 
period 1995-2013. Asset volatility (stock) is the volatility of the value of a firm's assets calculated based on 
Merton's model averaged over the period 1995-2013. Maturity is the sectoral median of the average firm level 
ratio of long-term debt to total debt in the US over the period 1995-2013. DEF is the sectoral median of the 
average firm level value of (capex - operating cashflow)/capex in the US over the period 1995-2013. Private 
credit is domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Domestic credit is domestic 
credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Capitalization is the sum of Domestic credit 
and the market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Bonds is debt securities (% 
of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Total capitalization is the sum of Capitalization and Bonds. Accounting is an 
index of accounting standards in 1993, with higher values indicating more disclosure. Getting credit is an index 
of the legal rights of borrowers and lenders that facilitate lending and a better availability of credit information 
in 2006, with higher values indicating easier access to credit. Contract enforcement is an index measuring the 
time and cost of resolving a commercial dispute through a local first-instance court in 2006, with higher values 
reflecting better enforcement. Resolving insolvency is an index measuring the time, cost and outcome of 
insolvency proceedings involving domestic entities as well as the strength of the legal framework applicable to 
liquidation and reorganization proceedings in 2006, with higher values indicating more efficient bankruptcy 
resolution. Government effectiveness is an index capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures in 1996, with higher 
values indicating more effective government policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Developing countries 
 
High-income coutries 
 
Variable 
 
Obs Mean SD 
 
Obs Mean SD 
 
Asset volatility (book) 
 9,484 0.35 0.309  15,317 0.349 0.346  
Asset volatility (stock) 
 8,841 0.0236 0.00941  13,906 0.0249 0.0124  
Maturity 
 11,219 0.778 0.124  18,840 0.756 0.124  
DEF 
 10,232 0.0444 1.428  17,968 0.132 1.382  
Private credit 
 11,219 0.58 0.392  18,793 1.049 0.481  
Domestic credit 
 11,219 0.724 0.362  18,793 1.391 0.823  
Capitalization 
 11,219 1.237 1.021  18,793 2.134 0.989  
Bonds 
 11,219 0.0367 0.0447  18,840 0.145 0.201  
Total capitalization 
 11,219 1.274 1.032  18,793 2.271 0.97  
Accounting 
 6,510 66.77 8.237  18,742 74.77 5.963  
Getting credit 
 11,219 42.99 22.5  18,742 78.2 13.8  
Contract enforcement 
 11,219 56.43 17.94  18,742 72.48 8.995  
Resolving insolvency 
 11,219 32.98 12.56  18,742 88.02 13.57  
Government effectiveness 
 11,219 0.057 0.459   18,840 1.433 0.482  
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Appendix B. Estimating the effect of financial development on firm volatility 
The regressions of Table 2 include country fixed effects to be able to identify a 
differential impact of the financial development variables on the volatility of firms in high-
maturity vs. low-maturity industries. The inclusion of country fixed effects enables us to 
control for any country-level determinants of firm-level volatility (beyond financial 
development) in the estimation. In Table B1 of this appendix, we report the results of re-
estimating the regressions of Table 2 without country fixed effects so that the financial 
development variables can be included in the estimation. The estimated coefficients in these 
regressions can be used to calculate an estimated impact of financial development on firm 
volatility.    
In the regressions of Panel A, asset volatility (book) is the dependent variable. The 
financial development proxies Private credit, Domestic credit, Capitalization and Total 
capitalization obtain negative and significant coefficients, while their interactions with 
Maturity are insignificant. From regression 1, we can calculate that a one standard deviation 
increase in Private credit is associated with a -0.057 (= -0.113 * 0.504) reduction in asset 
volatility, or about one fifth of its standard deviation. 
In the regressions of Panel B, asset volatility (stock) is the dependent variable. In these 
regressions, all five interactions of the various financial development proxies with Maturity 
obtain negative and significant coefficients, which is consistent with the results of Panel B of 
Table 2. The magnitudes of these coefficients are larger in absolute value than the 
corresponding coefficients in Panel B of Table 2, which suggests that country-level factors 
other than financial development could simultaneously explain reliance on long-term finance 
and firm volatility. Further, the financial development proxies obtain positive coefficients, 
which are significant in regressions 3 to 5 (for Capitalization, Bonds and Total 
capitalization). These results together imply that financial development tends to lower firm 
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volatility relatively more for firms that rely on longer term finance. The estimated 
coefficients in Panel B allow us to compute the estimated impact of financial development on 
the volatility of a firm with any maturity. For instance, for a firm in an industry with average 
maturity (0.764 as seen in Table 1), a one standard deviation increase in Total capitalization 
(1.104 from Table 1) is associated with a -0.00056 (= -0.00263 * 0.764 * 1.104 + 0.0015 * 
1.104) reduction in firm asset volatility (about 2 percent of its standard deviation). Overall, 
the results of Table B1 suggest that financial development per se reduces firm volatility. 
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Table B1: Firm volatility and use of long-term finance – estimating the effect of financial 
development 
 
In Panel A the dependent variable is Asset volatility (book) which is the standard deviation of the growth rate of 
the book value of total assets over the period 1995-2013. In Panel B the dependent variable is Asset volatility 
(stock) which is the volatility of the value of a firm’s assets calculated based on Merton’s model averaged over 
the period 1995-2013. Maturity is the sectoral median of the average firm level ratio of long-term debt to total 
debt in the US over the period 1995-2013. Private credit is domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of 
GDP) as of year-end 1995. Domestic credit is domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) as of 
year-end 1995. Capitalization is the sum of Domestic credit and the market capitalization of listed companies 
(% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Bonds is debt securities (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Total capitalization 
is the sum of Capitalization and Bonds. Country and industry fixed effects are included. Sample includes all 
firms except financial firms and firms in the public sector. Industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors 
are clustered at the country-industry level. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 
 Panel A    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (book) 
Private credit * Maturity  0.0383     
  (0.60)     
Private credit  -0.113**     
  (-2.12)     
Domestic credit * Maturity   0.00525    
   (0.16)    
Domestic credit   -0.0769***    
   (-2.78)    
Capitalization * Maturity    0.0383   
    (1.28)   
Capitalization    -0.0687***   
    (-2.78)   
Bonds * Maturity     -0.154  
     (-0.77)  
Bonds      0.218  
     (1.32)  
Total capitalization * Maturity      0.0391 
      (1.28) 
Total capitalization      -0.0667*** 
      (-2.64) 
Constant  0.604*** 0.616*** 0.602*** 0.531*** 0.605*** 
  (11.63) (11.79) (11.58) (10.93) (11.45) 
Observations  24763 24763 24763 24801 24763 
Adjusted R-squared  0.097 0.107 0.098 0.084 0.096 
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 Panel B   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (stock) 
Private credit * Maturity  -0.00406*     
  (-1.93)     
Private credit  0.000980     
  (0.58)     
Domestic credit * Maturity   -0.00354***    
   (-2.93)    
Domestic credit   0.000851    
   (0.89)    
Capitalization * Maturity    -0.00252***   
    (-2.63)   
Capitalization    0.00136*   
    (1.76)   
Bonds * Maturity     -0.0217***  
     (-3.04)  
Bonds      0.0196***  
     (3.31)  
Total capitalization * Maturity      -0.00263*** 
      (-2.74) 
Total capitalization      0.00150* 
      (1.94) 
Constant  0.0349*** 0.0353*** 0.0344*** 0.0329*** 0.0345*** 
  (17.46) (18.48) (17.32) (16.55) (17.40) 
Observations  22713 22713 22713 22747 22713 
Adjusted R-squared  0.202 0.209 0.197 0.196 0.197 
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Figure 1: Ratio of average long-term debt to assets of firms in developing and high-income 
countries 
 
The graph shows the average ratio of long-term debt to total assets for firms located in developing and high-
income countries based on World Bank classification in 1995. Developing countries include low-income and 
middle-income countries. LTD/TA is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Sample is restricted to firms 
with data throughout the 1995-2013 period. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Asset volatility (book) is the standard deviation of the growth rate of the book value of total assets over the 
period 1995-2013. Asset volatility (stock) is the volatility of the value of a firm's assets calculated based on 
Merton's model averaged over the period 1995-2013. Maturity is the sectoral median of the average firm level 
ratio of long-term debt to total debt in the US over the period 1995-2013. Private credit is domestic credit to 
private sector by banks (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Domestic credit is domestic credit provided by 
financial sector (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Capitalization is the sum of Domestic credit and the market 
capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Bonds is debt securities (% of GDP) as of 
year-end 1995. Total capitalization is the sum of Capitalization and Bonds. DEF is the sectoral median of the 
average firm level value of (capex - operating cashflow)/capex in the US over the period 1995-2013. 
Accounting is an index of accounting standards in 1993, with higher values indicating more disclosure. Getting 
credit is an index of the legal rights of borrowers and lenders that facilitate lending and a better availability of 
credit information in 2006, with higher values indicating easier access to credit. Contract enforcement is an 
index measuring the time and cost of resolving a commercial dispute through a local first-instance court in 2006, 
with higher values reflecting better enforcement. Resolving insolvency is an index measuring the time, cost and 
outcome of insolvency proceedings involving domestic entities as well as the strength of the legal framework 
applicable to liquidation and reorganization proceedings in 2006, with higher values indicating more efficient 
bankruptcy resolution. Government effectiveness is an index capturing perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures in 1996, with 
higher values indicating more effective government policies. Sample excludes US firms.  
 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Asset volatility (book) 24,801 0.349 0.332 0.0624 1.965 
Asset volatility (stock) 22,747 0.0244 0.0114 0.00850 0.0648 
Maturity 30,059 0.764 0.125 0.0208 0.993 
Private credit 30,012 0.874 0.504 0.0937 1.788 
Domestic credit 30,012 1.141 0.760 0.129 2.834 
Capitalization 30,012 1.799 1.091 0.295 3.774 
Bonds 30,059 0.104 0.170 0 3.176 
Total capitalization 30,012 1.898 1.104 0.298 3.856 
DEF 28,200 0.100 1.400 -3.089 7.863 
Accounting 25,252 72.71 7.491 56 85 
Getting credit 29,961 65.02 24.48 18.75 100 
Contract enforcement 29,961 66.47 15.21 25.81 93.36 
Resolving insolvency 29,961 67.41 29.73 0.480 99.71 
Government effectiveness 30,059 0.919 0.817 -0.588 2.101 
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Table 2: Firm volatility and use of long-term finance 
 
In Panel A the dependent variable is Asset volatility (book) which is the standard deviation of the growth rate of 
the book value of total assets over the period 1995-2013. In Panel B the dependent variable is Asset volatility 
(stock) which is the volatility of the value of a firm’s assets calculated based on Merton’s model averaged over 
the period 1995-2013. Maturity is the sectoral median of the average firm level ratio of long-term debt to total 
debt in the US over the period 1995-2013. Private credit is domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of 
GDP) as of year-end 1995. Domestic credit is domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) as of 
year-end 1995. Capitalization is the sum of Domestic credit and the market capitalization of listed companies 
(% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Bonds is debt securities (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Total capitalization 
is the sum of Capitalization and Bonds. Sample includes all firms except financial firms and firms in the public 
sector. Country and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the country-industry 
level. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 
 Panel A    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (book) 
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.0554***     
  
(-2.76)     
Domestic credit * Maturity  -0.0500***    
  
 (-3.21)    
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  -0.0179**   
  
  (-2.00)   
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   -0.0532*  
  
   (-1.85)  
Total capitalization * Maturity     -0.0181** 
  
    (-2.06) 
Observations 
 
24763 24763 24763 24801 24763 
Adjusted R-squared   0.141 0.141 0.140 0.140 0.140 
 
 
 Panel B   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (stock) 
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.00274**     
  
(-2.52)     
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
 -0.00304***    
  
 (-4.02)    
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  -0.00102**   
  
  (-2.26)   
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   -0.00401**  
  
   (-2.28)  
Total capitalization * Maturity 
 
    -0.00111** 
  
    (-2.48) 
Observations 
 
22713 22713 22713 22747 22713 
Adjusted R-squared   0.269 0.270 0.269 0.269 0.269 
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Table 3: Controlling for dependence on external finance 
 
In Panel A the dependent variable is Asset volatility (book) which is the standard deviation of the growth rate of the book value of total assets over the period 1995-2013. In 
Panel B the dependent variable is Asset volatility (stock) which is the volatility of the value of a firm’s assets calculated based on Merton’s model averaged over the period 
1995-2013. Maturity is the sectoral median of the average firm level ratio of long-term debt to total debt in the US over the period 1995-2013. DEF is the sectoral median of 
the average firm level value of (capex - operating cashflow)/capex in the US over the period 1995-2013. Private credit is domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of 
GDP) as of year-end 1995. Domestic credit is domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Capitalization is the sum of Domestic credit and 
the market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Bonds is debt securities (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Total capitalization is the sum of 
Capitalization and Bonds. Sample includes all firms except financial firms and firms in the public sector. Country and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are 
clustered at the country-industry level. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 
Panel A   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (book) 
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.0579***     
  
(-2.70)     
Private credit * DEF 
 
0.00664     
  
(1.18)     
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
 -0.0491***    
  
 (-2.91)    
Domestic credit * DEF 
 
 0.00424    
  
 (1.08)    
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  -0.0188**   
  
  (-2.01)   
Capitalization * DEF 
 
  0.00406   
  
  (1.51)   
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   -0.0318  
  
   (-1.02)  
Bonds * DEF 
 
   0.0454  
  
   (1.45)  
Total capitalization * Maturity 
 
    -0.0184** 
  
    (-1.99) 
Total capitalization * DEF 
 
    0.00504* 
  
    (1.80) 
Observations 
 
23196 23196 23196 23234 23196 
Adjusted R-squared  0.141 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.141 
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 Panel B   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (stock) 
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.00257**     
  
(-2.21)     
Private credit * DEF 
 
0.000302*     
  
(1.74)     
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
 -0.00299***    
  
 (-3.73)    
Domestic credit * DEF 
 
 0.000191    
  
 (1.50)    
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  -0.000981**   
  
  (-2.03)   
Capitalization * DEF 
 
  0.000108   
  
  (1.29)   
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   -0.00422***  
  
   (-2.73)  
Bonds * DEF 
 
   0.00376***  
  
   (4.99)  
Total capitalization * Maturity 
 
    -0.00105** 
  
    (-2.21) 
Total capitalization * DEF 
 
    0.000152* 
  
    (1.83) 
Observations 
 
21403 21403 21403 21436 21403 
Adjusted R-squared  0.267 0.268 0.267 0.270 0.267 
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Table 4: Firm volatility and use of long-term finance before 2007 
 
In Panel A the dependent variable is Asset volatility (book) which is the standard deviation of the growth rate of 
the book value of total assets over the period 1995-2006. In Panel B the dependent variable is Asset volatility 
(stock) which is the volatility of the value of a firm’s assets calculated based on Merton’s model averaged over 
the period 1995-2006. Maturity is the sectoral median of the average firm level ratio of long-term debt to total 
debt in the US over the period 1995-2013. Private credit is domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of 
GDP) as of year-end 1995. Domestic credit is domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) as of 
year-end 1995. Capitalization is the sum of Domestic credit and the market capitalization of listed companies 
(% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Bonds is debt securities (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Total capitalization 
is the sum of Capitalization and Bonds. Sample includes all firms except financial firms and firms in the public 
sector. Country and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the country-industry 
level. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 
 Panel A   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (book) 
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.0348*     
  
(-1.89)     
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
 -0.0282**    
  
 (-2.16)    
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  0.000383   
  
  (0.05)   
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   0.0209  
  
   (0.62)  
Total capitalization * Maturity 
 
    0.00146 
  
    (0.18) 
Observations 
 
15103 15103 15103 15121 15103 
Adjusted R-squared   0.152 0.152 0.152 0.152 0.152 
 
 
 Panel B   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (stock) 
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.00132     
  
(-1.07)     
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
 -0.00191**    
  
 (-2.24)    
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  -0.000305   
  
  (-0.57)   
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   -0.00307  
  
   (-1.57)  
Total capitalization * Maturity 
 
    -0.000389 
  
    (-0.74) 
Observations 
 
16824 16824 16824 16845 16824 
Adjusted R-squared   0.262 0.262 0.261 0.262 0.262 
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Table 5: Firm volatility and use of long-term finance between 2007 and 2013 
 
In Panel A the dependent variable is Asset volatility (book) which is the standard deviation of the growth rate of 
the book value of total assets over the period 2007-2013. In Panel B the dependent variable is Asset volatility 
(stock) which is the volatility of the value of a firm’s assets calculated based on Merton’s model averaged over 
the period 2007-2013. Maturity is the sectoral median of the average firm level ratio of long-term debt to total 
debt in the US over the period 1995-2013. Private credit is domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of 
GDP) as of year-end 1995. Domestic credit is domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) as of 
year-end 1995. Capitalization is the sum of Domestic credit and the market capitalization of listed companies 
(% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Bonds is debt securities (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Total capitalization 
is the sum of Capitalization and Bonds. Sample includes all firms except financial firms and firms in the public 
sector. Country and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the country-industry 
level. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 
 Panel A   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (book) 
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.0338**     
  
(-2.46)     
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
 -0.0337***    
  
 (-3.64)    
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  -0.0179***   
  
  (-2.88)   
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   -0.0325  
  
   (-0.91)  
Total capitalization * Maturity 
 
    -0.0172*** 
  
    (-2.77) 
Observations 
 
18833 18833 18833 18858 18833 
Adjusted R-squared  0.143 0.143 0.143 0.142 0.143 
 
 
Panel B   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (stock) 
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.00422***     
  
(-3.51)     
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
 -0.00361***    
  
 (-4.09)    
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  -0.00168***   
  
  (-3.30)   
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   -0.00404*  
  
   (-1.76)  
Total capitalization * Maturity 
 
    -0.00167*** 
  
    (-3.37) 
Observations 
 
17997 17997 17997 18024 17997 
Adjusted R-squared  0.253 0.254 0.253 0.252 0.253 
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Table 6: Firm volatility, the use of long-term finance and firm age: young firms 
 
In Panel A the dependent variable is Asset volatility (book) which is the standard deviation of the growth rate of 
the book value of total assets over the period 1995-2013. In Panel B the dependent variable is Asset volatility 
(stock) which is the volatility of the value of a firm’s assets calculated based on Merton’s model averaged over 
the period 1995-2013. Maturity is the sectoral median of the average firm level ratio of long-term debt to total 
debt in the US over the period 1995-2013. Private credit is domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of 
GDP) as of year-end 1995. Domestic credit is domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) as of 
year-end 1995. Capitalization is the sum of Domestic credit and the market capitalization of listed companies 
(% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Bonds is debt securities (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Total capitalization 
is the sum of Capitalization and Bonds. The sample excludes financial firms and firms in the public sector, as 
well as sectors where the average age of US firms is above the median firm age. Country and industry fixed 
effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the country-industry level. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 
 Panel A   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (book) 
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.0712** 
    
  
(-2.28) 
    
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
 
-0.0606** 
   
  
 
(-2.56) 
   
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  
-0.0423*** 
  
  
  
(-3.01) 
  
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   
-0.0344 
 
  
   
(-0.65) 
 
Total capitalization * Maturity 
    
-0.0412*** 
  
    
(-2.94) 
Observations 
 
10482 10482 10482 10512 10482 
Adjusted R-squared   0.124 0.124 0.124 0.123 0.124 
  
 
 Panel B   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (stock) 
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.00308* 
    
  
(-1.86) 
    
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
-0.00388*** 
   
  
 
(-3.25) 
   
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  
-0.00175** 
  
  
  
(-2.52) 
  
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   
-0.00273 
 
  
   
(-1.45) 
 
Total capitalization * Maturity 
    
-0.00182*** 
  
    
(-2.68) 
Observations 
 
10038 10038 10038 10065 10038 
Adjusted R-squared  0.208 0.209 0.208 0.208 0.208 
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Table 7: Firm volatility, the use of long-term finance and firm age: old firms 
 
In Panel A the dependent variable is Asset volatility (book) which is the standard deviation of the growth rate of 
the book value of total assets over the period 1995-2013. In Panel B the dependent variable is Asset volatility 
(stock) which is the volatility of the value of a firm’s assets calculated based on Merton’s model averaged over 
the period 1995-2013. Maturity is the sectoral median of the average firm level ratio of long-term debt to total 
debt in the US over the period 1995-2013. Private credit is domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of 
GDP) as of year-end 1995. Domestic credit is domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) as of 
year-end 1995. Capitalization is the sum of Domestic credit and the market capitalization of listed companies 
(% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Bonds is debt securities (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Total capitalization 
is the sum of Capitalization and Bonds. The sample excludes financial firms and firms in the public sector, as 
well as sectors where the average age of US firms is below the median firm age. Country and industry fixed 
effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the country-industry level. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 
Panel A    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (book) 
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.0407* 
    
  
(-1.67) 
    
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
-0.0420*** 
   
  
 
(-2.65) 
   
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  
-0.00106 
  
  
  
(-0.10) 
  
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   
-0.0416 
 
  
   
(-1.40) 
 
Total capitalization * Maturity 
    
-0.000946 
  
    
(-0.09) 
Observations 
 
14127 14127 14127 14135 14127 
Adjusted R-squared  0.132 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.132 
 
 
 Panel B   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (stock) 
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.00160 
    
  
(-1.35) 
    
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
 
-0.00162** 
   
  
 
(-2.12) 
   
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  
0.0000266 
  
  
  
(0.05) 
  
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   
-0.00649*** 
 
  
   
(-2.77) 
 
Total capitalization * Maturity 
 
    
-0.0000523 
  
    
(-0.11) 
Observations 
 
12532 12532 12532 12539 12532 
Adjusted R-squared  0.280 0.280 0.280 0.280 0.280 
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Table 8: Firm volatility, long-term finance, and accounting standards 
 
In Panel A the dependent variable is Asset volatility (book) which is the standard deviation of the growth rate of the book value of total assets over the period 1995-2013. In 
Panel B the dependent variable is Asset volatility (stock) which is the volatility of the value of a firm’s assets calculated based on Merton’s model averaged over the period 
1995-2013. Maturity is the sectoral median of the average firm level ratio of long-term debt to total debt in the US over the period 1995-2013. Accounting is an index of 
accounting standards in 1993, with higher values indicate more disclosure. Private credit is domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. 
Domestic credit is domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Capitalization is the sum of Domestic credit and the market capitalization of 
listed companies (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Bonds is debt securities (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Total capitalization is the sum of Capitalization and Bonds. 
Sample includes all firms except financial firms and firms in the public sector. Country and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the country-
industry level. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 
 Panel A   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (book) 
Private credit * Maturity * Accounting 
 
0.00731*     
  
(1.91)     
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.575**     
  
(-2.10)     
Domestic credit * Maturity * Accounting 
 
 0.00511    
  
 (1.19)    
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
 -0.405    
  
 (-1.33)    
Capitalization * Maturity * Accounting 
 
  0.00551***   
  
  (2.97)   
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  -0.411***   
  
  (-3.08)   
Bonds * Maturity * Accounting 
 
   0.0305**  
  
   (1.96)  
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   -2.307*  
  
   (-1.93)  
Total capitalization * Maturity * Accounting 
 
    0.00556*** 
  
    (3.08) 
Total capitalization * Maturity 
 
    -0.414*** 
  
    (-3.20) 
Maturity * Accounting 
 
-0.00457 -0.00419 -0.00782** -0.00384* -0.00865*** 
  
(-1.58) (-1.08) (-2.52) (-1.74) (-2.62) 
Observations 
 
20908 20908 20908 20908 20908 
Adjusted R-squared  0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 
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 Panel B   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (stock) 
Private credit * Maturity * Accounting 
 
0.000306     
  
(1.55)     
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.0240*     
  
(-1.67)     
Domestic credit * Maturity * Accounting 
 
 0.000217    
  
 (1.00)    
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
 -0.0176    
  
 (-1.14)    
Capitalization * Maturity * Accounting 
 
  0.000109   
  
  (1.18)   
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  -0.00849   
  
  (-1.25)   
Bonds * Maturity * Accounting 
 
   0.00171*  
  
   (1.90)  
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   -0.136**  
  
   (-1.96)  
Total capitalization * Maturity * Accounting 
 
    0.000114 
  
    (1.22) 
Total capitalization * Maturity 
 
    -0.00887 
  
    (-1.31) 
Maturity * Accounting 
 
-0.000316* -0.000296 -0.000266 -0.000283* -0.000282 
  
(-1.75) (-1.29) (-1.50) (-1.94) (-1.47) 
Observations 
 
18950 18950 18950 18950 18950 
Adjusted R-squared  0.294 0.295 0.294 0.294 0.294 
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Table 9: Firm volatility, long-term finance, and ease of getting credit 
 
In Panel A the dependent variable is Asset volatility (book) which is the standard deviation of the growth rate of the book value of total assets over the period 1995-2013. In 
Panel B the dependent variable is Asset volatility (stock) which is the volatility of the value of a firm’s assets calculated based on Merton’s model averaged over the period 
1995-2013. Maturity is the sectoral median of the average firm level ratio of long-term debt to total debt in the US over the period 1995-2013. Getting credit is an index of the 
legal rights of borrowers and lenders that facilitate lending and a better availability of credit information in 2006, with higher values indicating easier access to credit. Private 
credit is domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Domestic credit is domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) as of year-
end 1995. Capitalization is the sum of Domestic credit and the market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Bonds is debt securities (% of 
GDP) as of year-end 1995. Total capitalization is the sum of Capitalization and Bonds. Sample includes all firms except financial firms and firms in the public sector. 
Country and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the country-industry level. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 Panel A   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (book) 
Private credit * Maturity * Getting credit 
 
0.00117     
  
(0.84)     
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.129     
  
(-1.27)     
Domestic credit * Maturity * Getting credit 
 
 0.00159    
  
 (0.95)    
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
 -0.159    
  
 (-1.32)    
Capitalization * Maturity * Getting credit 
 
  0.00196***   
  
  (2.75)   
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  -0.166***   
  
  (-2.99)   
Bonds * Maturity * Getting credit 
 
   0.0184***  
  
   (2.95)  
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   -1.405***  
  
   (-3.08)  
Total capitalization * Maturity * Getting credit     0.00194*** 
  
    (2.90) 
Total capitalization * Maturity 
 
    -0.166*** 
  
    (-3.18) 
Maturity * Getting credit 
 
-0.00123 -0.00170 -0.00279** -0.00175*** -0.00282** 
  
(-0.93) (-1.07) (-2.33) (-2.60) (-2.34) 
Observations 
 
24718 24718 24718 24718 24718 
Adjusted R-squared  0.141 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.141 
 Panel B   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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Asset volatility (stock) 
Private credit * Maturity * Getting credit 
 
0.000276***     
  
(4.04)     
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.0206***     
  
(-4.08)     
Domestic credit * Maturity * Getting credit 
 
 0.000267***    
  
 (3.38)    
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
 -0.0216***    
  
 (-3.75)    
Capitalization * Maturity * Getting credit 
 
  0.000171***   
  
  (5.14)   
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  -0.0134***   
  
  (-4.97)   
Bonds * Maturity * Getting credit 
 
   0.000834***  
  
   (3.31)  
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   -0.0681***  
  
   (-3.71)  
Total capitalization * Maturity * Getting credit 
 
    0.000161*** 
  
    (5.24) 
Total capitalization * Maturity 
 
    -0.0126*** 
  
    (-5.08) 
Maturity * Getting credit 
 
-0.000290*** -0.000286*** -0.000282*** -0.000104*** -0.000276*** 
  
(-4.50) (-3.72) (-5.50) (-3.59) (-5.48) 
Observations 
 
22683 22683 22683 22683 22683 
Adjusted R-squared  0.271 0.271 0.271 0.270 0.271 
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Table 10: Firm volatility, long-term finance, and contract enforcement 
 
In Panel A the dependent variable is Asset volatility (book) which is the standard deviation of the growth rate of the book value of total assets over the period 1995-2013. In 
Panel B the dependent variable is Asset volatility (stock) which is the volatility of the value of a firm’s assets calculated based on Merton’s model averaged over the period 
1995-2013. Maturity is the sectoral median of the average firm level ratio of long-term debt to total debt in the US over the period 1995-2013. Contract enforcement is an 
index measuring the time and cost for resolving a commercial dispute through a local first-instance court in 2006, with higher values reflecting better enforcement. Private 
credit is domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Domestic credit is domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) as of year-
end 1995. Capitalization is the sum of Domestic credit and the market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Bonds is debt securities (% of 
GDP) as of year-end 1995. Total capitalization is the sum of Capitalization and Bonds. Sample includes all firms except financial firms and firms in the public sector. 
Country and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the country-industry level. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 Panel A   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (book) 
Private credit * Maturity * Contract enforcement 
 
-0.0000486     
  
(-0.02)     
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.0558     
  
(-0.37)     
Domestic credit * Maturity * Contract enforcement 
 
 -0.00317    
  
 (-1.37)    
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
 0.172    
  
 (1.07)    
Capitalization * Maturity * Contract enforcement 
 
  0.000477   
  
  (0.52)   
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  -0.0529   
  
  (-0.78)   
Bonds * Maturity * Contract enforcement 
 
   0.00807  
  
   (0.67)  
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   -0.709  
  
   (-0.82)  
Total capitalization * Maturity * Contract enforcement     0.000519 
  
    (0.59) 
Total capitalization * Maturity 
 
    -0.0570 
  
    (-0.87) 
Maturity * Contract enforcement 
 
0.000433 0.00222 -0.000525 -0.000745 -0.000534 
  
(0.31) (1.27) (-0.39) (-0.74) (-0.39) 
Observations 
 
24718 24718 24718 24718 24718 
Adjusted R-squared  0.141 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.141 
 Panel B   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
55 
 
  
Asset volatility (stock) 
Private credit * Maturity * Contract enforcement 
 
0.000498***     
  
(5.07)     
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.0383***     
  
(-5.31)     
Domestic credit * Maturity * Contract enforcement 
 
 0.000458***    
  
 (4.14)    
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
 -0.0351***    
  
 (-4.47)    
Capitalization * Maturity * Contract enforcement 
 
  0.000237***   
  
  (5.45)   
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  -0.0183***   
  
  (-5.58)   
Bonds * Maturity * Contract enforcement 
 
   0.00183***  
  
   (2.87)  
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   -0.144***  
  
   (-3.09)  
Total capitalization * Maturity * Contract enforcement     0.000233*** 
  
    (5.49) 
Total capitalization * Maturity 
 
    -0.0181*** 
  
    (-5.66) 
Maturity * Contract enforcement 
 
-0.000242*** -0.000304*** -0.000283*** -0.000106* -0.000284*** 
  
(-3.19) (-3.18) (-3.74) (-1.80) (-3.74) 
Observations 
 
22683 22683 22683 22683 22683 
Adjusted R-squared  0.271 0.271 0.271 0.270 0.271 
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Table 11: Firm volatility, long-term finance, and insolvency resolution 
 
In Panel A the dependent variable is Asset volatility (book) which is the standard deviation of the growth rate of the book value of total assets over the period 1995-2013. In 
Panel B the dependent variable is Asset volatility (stock) which is the volatility of the value of a firm’s assets calculated based on Merton’s model averaged over the period 
1995-2013. Maturity is the sectoral median of the average firm level ratio of long-term debt to total debt in the US over the period 1995-2013. Resolving insolvency is an 
index measuring the time, cost and outcome of insolvency proceedings involving domestic entities as well as the strength of the legal framework applicable to liquidation and 
reorganization proceedings in 2006, with higher values indicating more efficient bankruptcy resolution. Private credit is domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of 
GDP) as of year-end 1995. Domestic credit is domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Capitalization is the sum of Domestic credit and 
the market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Bonds is debt securities (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Total capitalization is the sum of 
Capitalization and Bonds. Sample includes all firms except financial firms and firms in the public sector. Country and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are 
clustered at the country-industry level. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 Panel A   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (book) 
Private credit * Maturity * Resolving insolvency 
 
0.000276     
  
(0.30)     
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.0625     
  
(-0.81)     
Domestic credit * Maturity * Resolving insolvency 
 
 0.000301    
  
 (0.41)    
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
 -0.0690    
  
 (-1.01)    
Capitalization * Maturity * Resolving insolvency 
 
  0.0000883   
  
  (0.25)   
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  -0.0159   
  
  (-0.57)   
Bonds * Maturity * Resolving insolvency 
 
   0.00891  
  
   (1.60)  
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   -0.782  
  
   (-1.64)  
Total capitalization * Maturity * Resolving insolvency 
 
    0.000117 
  
    (0.32) 
Total capitalization * Maturity 
 
    -0.0187 
  
    (-0.66) 
Maturity * Resolving insolvency 
 
-0.000549 -0.000504 -0.000653 -0.00120** -0.000673 
  
(-0.78) (-0.78) (-0.95) (-2.32) (-0.92) 
Observations 
 
24718 24718 24718 24718 24718 
Adjusted R-squared  0.141 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.141 
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 Panel B   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (stock) 
Private credit * Maturity * Resolving insolvency 
 
0.0000520     
  
(1.11)     
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.00436     
  
(-1.14)     
Domestic credit * Maturity * Resolving insolvency 
 
 0.0000239    
  
 (0.67)    
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
 -0.00399    
  
 (-1.21)    
Capitalization * Maturity * Resolving insolvency 
 
  0.0000374*   
  
  (1.94)   
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  -0.00262*   
  
  (-1.83)   
Bonds * Maturity * Resolving insolvency 
 
   0.000308  
  
   (1.23)  
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   -0.0306  
  
   (-1.41)  
Total capitalization * Maturity * Resolving insolvency 
 
    0.0000387** 
  
    (2.00) 
Total capitalization * Maturity 
 
    -0.00273* 
  
    (-1.90) 
Maturity * Resolving insolvency 
 
-0.000106*** -0.0000704** -0.000131*** -0.0000808*** -0.000136*** 
  
(-2.69) (-2.03) (-3.53) (-3.14) (-3.47) 
Observations 
 
22683 22683 22683 22683 22683 
Adjusted R-squared  0.270 0.270 0.270 0.270 0.270 
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Table 12: Firm volatility, long-term finance, and government effectiveness 
 
In Panel A the dependent variable is Asset volatility (book) which is the standard deviation of the growth rate of the book value of total assets over the period 1995-2013. In 
Panel B the dependent variable is Asset volatility (stock) which is the volatility of the value of a firm’s assets calculated based on Merton’s model averaged over the period 
1995-2013. Maturity is the sectoral median of the average firm level ratio of long-term debt to total debt in the US over the period 1995-2013. Government effectiveness is an 
index capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures in 1996, with higher 
values indicating more effective government policies. Private credit is domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Domestic credit is 
domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Capitalization is the sum of Domestic credit and the market capitalization of listed companies 
(% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Bonds is debt securities (% of GDP) as of year-end 1995. Total capitalization is the sum of Capitalization and Bonds. Sample includes all 
firms except financial firms and firms in the public sector. Country and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the country-industry level. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 Panel A   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (book) 
Private credit * Maturity * Government effectiveness 
 
-0.00438     
  
(-0.11)     
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.0319     
  
(-0.73)     
Domestic credit * Maturity * Government effectiveness 
 
 -0.0609    
  
 (-1.34)    
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
 0.0142    
  
 (0.33)    
Capitalization * Maturity * Government effectiveness 
 
  0.0256   
  
  (1.16)   
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  -0.0298   
  
  (-1.33)   
Bonds * Maturity * Government effectiveness 
 
   0.169**  
  
   (2.15)  
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   -0.255**  
  
   (-2.41)  
Total capitalization * Maturity * Government effectiveness 
 
    0.0281 
  
    (1.44) 
Total capitalization * Maturity 
 
    -0.0315 
  
    (-1.53) 
Maturity * Government effectiveness 
 
-0.0225 0.0247 -0.0629* -0.0453*** -0.0694** 
  
(-0.74) (0.64) (-1.89) (-2.87) (-2.10) 
Observations 
 
24763 24763 24763 24801 24763 
Adjusted R-squared  0.141 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.141 
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 Panel B   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Asset volatility (stock) 
Private credit * Maturity * Government effectiveness 0.00381**     
  
(2.10)     
Private credit * Maturity 
 
-0.00417*     
  
(-1.93)     
Domestic credit * Maturity * Government effectiveness  0.000542    
  
 (0.28)    
Domestic credit * Maturity 
 
 -0.00256    
  
 (-1.30)    
Capitalization * Maturity * Government effectiveness   0.00296***   
  
  (3.06)   
Capitalization * Maturity 
 
  -0.00263**   
  
  (-2.42)   
Bonds * Maturity * Government effectiveness 
 
   0.00310  
  
   (0.87)  
Bonds * Maturity 
 
   -0.00534  
  
   (-1.01)  
Total capitalization * Maturity * Government effectiveness     0.00260*** 
  
    (2.99) 
Total capitalization * Maturity 
 
    -0.00225** 
  
    (-2.21) 
Maturity * Government effectiveness 
 
-0.00558*** -0.00299* -0.00699*** -0.00311*** -0.00685*** 
  
(-3.84) (-1.69) (-4.80) (-4.35) (-4.76) 
Observations 
 
22713 22713 22713 22747 22713 
Adjusted R-squared  0.271 0.271 0.271 0.270 0.271 
 
  
